Speed, Blitzkrieg, and how the allies resisted it.

    If you were to walk down the streets of Europe in 1910, and said which war would have been the conflict that would have been centralized around speed, the first or the second world war, they might say the first world war, after they ask questions about “what world wars, and why will we have two of them?” That being said, with hindsight, the answer quickly switches to the second world war being the one that had a need for speed. 

    Fundamentally, Germany formed their main strategic and tactical doctrine around speed and aggression, enabling both a rapid expansion, an ability to exploit any tactical gains, and intense psychological damage to frontline troops, which in turn deals damage to their opponent’s society. However, a speed based-doctrine would ultimately lose out against the remaining Allied powers through a mixture, of doctrine and tactical changes (British and Commonwealth), the ever-changing scale of the fronts (the Soviets), mental conditioning to prepare for blitzkrieg (Soviets and British), and ultimately, time.

    Let us start off with something simple, how was speed used by the Germans? The classic classroom answer is simple: blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg, translating to “lightning war”, is a military tactic calculated to create psychological shock and resultant disorganization in enemy forces through the employment of surprise, speed, and superiority in matériel or firepower. This translates onto the battlefield as thus; a swift bombing run done by both heavy bombers and/or dive bombers, which will then be followed up with tanks, that would blast everything they come across as they concentrate their attack around selected points in the enemy frontline, causing breakthroughs that will then in turn be exploited by infantry. 

    As one might imagine, this kind of warfare relies on overwhelming enemies, but speed is perhaps one of its key elements. And it is that speed that is perhaps one of the most damaging aspects for their foes. Marc Bloch was a veteran of the First World War, and also wrote of the German triumph over the Anglo-French forces during the German invasion of France. One thing he emphasized was that of speed, albeit in different ways. He talked of the speed between an order said by high command and it reaching the men; “More than once during the first World War it was brought home to me how inefficient the High Command could be when it came to calculating accurately the length of time needed for an order once issued from H.Q., to pass through its various recipients until finally it reached the formations who would have to act upon. [...] a runner’s pace is slow, and that he will often go wrong when roads and tracks that have been turned into a sea of mud.”

    This error in French military command would continue, as many French tanks would be without radios, aside from the command tank, whereas all German tanks did have radios, resulting in German tank units being more responsive and quicker to act upon orders received by higher-ups. However, this wasn’t the only form of the damage that speed could inflict as Marc would continue to write in regards to how speed affects distance; “Read over the list of where the First Army established its headquarters during the campaign of the Nord: Valenciennes, Douai, lens, Estaires, Attriches, Steenwerck. Each time the enemy exerted pressure there was a withdrawal. This was only to be expected. But what was the extent of these withdrawals? The average was between 20 and 30 kilometers (12.4 and 18.6 miles), never more than 30.”

    Here, Bloch notes that German offensives meant that French frontlines would often fall back, and then in turn, force the Headquarters back. Further noted here is that the distance was also small, meaning that not only did it occur constantly, but it also occurred swiftly, that the distance one has to go before they have to fall back again is comparatively small. 

    This all leads back to psychology. “The ruling idea of the Germans in the conduct of this war is speed. [...] Worse still: faced by the undisputed evidence of Germany’s new tactics, we ignored, or wholly failed to understand, the quickened rhythm of the times. [...] We interpreted the war in terms of assagai versus rifles made familiar to us by long years of colonial expansion, But this time it was we who were cast for the rôle of the savage!” Bloch draws an interesting comparison, effectively saying that due to the speed of the German blitzkrieg, and the poor response to it by the French, it was as though it was an old colonial conflict, with them playing the role of the native tribe that was about to be steamrolled. Leading us back to psychology, because once soldiers make that connection, then morale quickly follows. Add in the fact that falling back swiftly becomes another form of pain, as German tanks will always be close behind you, which can help facilitate the collapse of a frontline. The Germans counted on this actually, by doing things such as attaching sirens to their dive-bombers with the deliberate purpose of unnerving foes. 

    So if Bloch shows how the blitzkrieg works, how does one stop it? Well, as mentioned earlier, different allied powers found different solutions that, taken as a whole, deteriorate the effects of blitzkrieg. One big way is to counteract the terror tactics by ensuring that your own men have high morale, and won’t flee once subjected to the psychological attacks. The British solution was “battle schools”, in which “battle inoculation” and “hate training” occurred, which while controversial, should be acknowledged. A huge part of this was to instill new battle drills to replace drills that didn’t work, acclimate new soldiers to the noise and fog of war, and to instill a strong dislike for the Germans. Again, while controversial, this counteracted one of the big advantages of speed-based warfare, and that was the shock and psychology of a blitzkrieg attack. Plus, an instilled hatred for your foe would increase the likelihood that you would stand and fight, and the inoculation of noise and fog would mean that you would actually remember your training once the panzers appear. 

    The Soviets, for their part, tried a different method. While Hollywood and pop-history shows the Soviet answer to be “gun down anyone who flees”, many political commissars found that a better solution was to be found in the carrot rather than the stick. Commissars made it a point at times to deliver creature comforts like chocolate bars and mandarin oranges to frontline troops in Stalingrad to remind them that the Union and the workers back home remembered them. Izer Ayzenberg of the 38th Rifle Division came up with a clever answer with the Agitcult case. This case shaped like a magician’s box contained both material to help teach soldiers about the parties political beliefs, as well as a litany of other activities, such as learning geography, reading material, and even some games. “Another group is playing checkers, another is reading brochures, riddles, and songs – soldiers are laughing cheerfully. Serious brochures are being read in the corner. [...] That’s how we used it: I would come to the 1st Battalion headquarters, leave them the briefcase for a day, then take it to the 2nd Battalion and so on.” Fundamentally, the Soviets at Stalingrad found a different solution, but got to the same end thought as the British battle schools: men that had high morale, either due to an enthusiasm for the fight or from small creature comforts provided to them by higher ups, are more likely to stand and fight. 

    Of course, high morale to counteract the psychological aspects of blitzkrieg is not the only thing that needs addressing. The British in North Africa were slowly, but surely, figuring out how to blunt the spearpoint, in part, by learning their lessons from France. In France, the British were entrapped within Dunkirk, where the Germans were able to achieve an encirclement, and their backs to the sea. Only by several strokes of luck, did the Brits escape with most of their army intact. Yet the story repeats itself in North Africa at Tobruk, in which the Germans encircled a British/Australian/Indian garrison. Here though, the Australians figured out a solution, and part of the solution to the blitzkrieg encirclement question is simple; be just as aggressive a defender. The chief commander of Tobruk, Major General Leslie Morshead of the 9th Australian Division, employed a strategy of “making the besiegers the besieged”. This was accomplished by aggressive patrols against German forces, dominating the no-man’s land, which in turn helped stave off German attacks. This would be ultimately successful, and Tobruk did not become like Dunkirk. By taking a more aggressive defense, Australian troops would slowly acclimatize to fighting, and would oftentimes find themselves on the winning end of these small-scale skirmishes, raising morale, or at the very least, keeping morale stable.

    Another aspect was the air war, as the Germans leaned heavily on the air force to deliver the first strike. The Brits once again, found a solution in North Africa: take the planes out before they even fly. This might sound absurd, but the British quickly created several raiding task forces, among them the Long Range Desert Group (the LRDG), the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS). These groups would infiltrate Italo-German controlled areas in North Africa to strike at supply depots, and most importantly, air bases. David Stirling, the founder of the SAS explicitly founded the unit for raiding airbases. These groups would take out air bases, which in turn blunted the German ability to use air power.

    For the Soviets, scale was an important factor as well, as the sheer vastness of the USSR meant that sure, you could probably encircle a couple of divisions, but it was also now just as easy for you to be encircled as well. If the Germans were the experts of first strike blitzkrieg, then the Soviets would be what happens when someone figures out how to do a counterattack that would hurt far more than the first strike. The Germans might have attached sirens to their dive bombers, but the Soviets had a rocket battery system that made an unholy noise (Katyushas). 

    Finally, the ultimate one is that of time. Simply put, blitzkrieg is a strategy that relies on constantly being on the offensive, always on high speed. So, what happens when you are forced to slow down? Ultimately, that is what marked the end of blitzkrieg. Once Tobruk and Moscow held, breathing space was given to the British and Soviets to rearm. The Battle of Britain paradoxically gave the British the time to rearm and reequip themselves for the struggles of North Africa, and by extension, Italy and France. Once the blitzkrieg stalled, time was given for British and Soviet commanders like Montgomery and Zhukov to rethink new battle plans and doctrines. Time that was spent by the British and Soviets to reforge their troops to be more resistant to the speed and psychological damages of blitzkrieg. And by the time that the Germans tried blitzkrieg once more, it no longer had the same effect. Instead of the fall of France or Poland, they were met with El Alamein and Kursk. And by that point, US forces were now in motion, and with it, a loss of the Atlantic and of the air war. Speed was Germany's greatest ally in 1939 and 1940. But once they lost it, what awaited them was a slow strangulation by the Soviets, the British, and the Americans in 1943, ‘44 and ‘45. 

Sources:

• Limbach, and Raymond. “Blitzkrieg | Definition, Translation, and Facts.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 20 July 1998, www.britannica.com/topic/blitzkrieg.
• Bloch, Marc Léopold Benjamin, et al. Strange Defeat : A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940. Pg. 35, 37, 38 1940, ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA64405924.
• Bourke, Joanna. “Psychiatry, Hate Training, and the Second World War.” Journal of Social History 52, no. 1 (2018): 101–20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26804140.
• Jochen Hellbeck. 2015. Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich, pg 45
•  Riches, Leah. “‘Tobruk Is Not a Siege, nor a Defence. It Is a Permanent Offensive ... Day after Day, Night after Night.’ The Patrolling War in Tobruk.” Australian War Memorial Website, 2012.
• “Special Air Service.” National Army Museum, www.nam.ac.uk/explore/SAS.
• A History of the SBS - the Special Boat Service. www.eliteukforces.info/special-boat-service/history.
• Levrier-Jones, George. “World War 2 in North Africa - the Long-Range Desert Group — History Is Now Magazine, Podcasts, Blog and Books | Modern International and American History.” History Is Now Magazine, Podcasts, Blog and Books | Modern International and American History, 10 Sept. 2024, www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2024/9/10/world-war-2-in-north-africa-the-long-range-desert-group.